Towards a Framework for the Study of "No War, No Peace" Societies by Dijkzeul, Dennis
Working Paper Schw
ei
ze
ri
sc
he
 F
ri
ed
en
ss
ti
ft
un
g
Fo
nd
at
io
n 
su
is
se
 p
ou
r 
la
 p
ai
x
Fo
nd
az
io
ne
 s
vi
zz
er
a 
pe
r 
la
 p
ac
e
Sw
is
s 
Pe
ac
e 
Fo
un
da
ti
on
 
 
 
Towards a Framework for the Study
 of "No War, No Peace" Societies
 
Dennis Dijkzeul
2 | 2008   
  
  
  
swisspeace 
 
swisspeace is an action-oriented peace research 
institute with headquarters in Bern, Switzer-
land. It aims to prevent the outbreak of 
violent conflicts and to enable sustainable 
conflict transformation. 
swisspeace sees itself as a center of excellence and 
an information platform in the areas of 
conflict analysis and peacebuilding. We 
conduct research on the causes of war and 
violent conflict, develop tools for early 
recognition of tensions, and formulate 
conflict mitigation and peacebuilding 
strategies. swisspeace contributes to 
information exchange and networking on 
current issues of peace and security policy 
through its analyses and reports as well as 
meetings and conferences. 
swisspeace was founded in 1988 as the “Swiss 
Peace Foundation” with the goal of 
promoting independent peace research in 
Switzerland. Today swisspeace engages 
about 40 staff members. Its most important 
clients include the Swiss Federal 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and 
the Swiss National Science Foundation. Its 
activities are further assisted by 
contributions from its Support Association. 
The supreme swisspeace body is the 
Foundation Council, which is comprised of 
representatives from politics, science, and 
the government. 
 
 
 
 
Working Papers 
In its working paper series, swisspeace 
publishes reports by staff members and 
international experts, covering recent issues 
of peace research and peacebuilding. Please 
note our publication list at the end of this 
paper or on www.swisspeace.org. 
The views expressed in this publication are those of 
the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect 
the views of swisspeace. 
. 
 
Publisher: swisspeace 
Design: Leib&Gut, Visuelle Gestaltung, Bern 
Print: CopyQuick Printing Center, Bern 
Copies: 300 
Ordering information: swisspeace, Sonnenbergstrasse 17, 
PO Box, 3000 Bern 7, Switzerland 
www.swisspeace.org 
info@swisspeace.ch 
© 2008 swisspeace 
ISBN 978-3-908230-71-7 
   
 
Working Paper 
 
 
2 | 2008 
 
Towards a Framework for a the Study  
of “No War, No Peace” Societies 
 
 
 
 
 Dennis Dijkzeul 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 2008 
 
  
 
About the Author 
Dr. Dennis Dijkzeul is Professor in the 
Management of Humanitarian Crises at the 
Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed 
Conflict (IFHV) at the Ruhr University in Bochum, 
Germany. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract/Zusammenfassung/Résumé ______________________ 1 
Preface ____________________________________________ 2 
1 Introduction ______________________________________ 3 
2 “No War, No Peace” Societies _______________________ 4 
2.1 Concepts of Violent Conflict in Historical Perspective 5 
2.2 Security 11 
2.3 Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding 13 
2.4 Conflicting Conclusions 13 
3 The Analytical Value of “No War, No Peace” Societies __ 16 
4 Institutions and Reproduction of Conflict _____________ 18 
4.1 Definitions 18 
4.2 Different Institutional Forms 23 
4.3 How Institutions Influence Behavior and Society 26 
4.4 Institutional Change 29 
5 The Larger Research Project: Methodology, Objectives  
and Outputs _____________________________________ 30 
5.1 Research Strategy 30 
5.2 Research Plan 30 
5.3 Research Objectives and Outputs 32 
    

Abstract/Zusammenfassung/Résumé 
  1 
Abstract/Zusammenfassung/Résumé 
This research paper provides a theoretical and methodological framework for studying the social 
construction and consequences of “no war, no peace” societies - with Armenia and Azerbaijan as 
examples. Scholars regularly describe these two countries as “no war, no peace” societies but to 
date the concept of a “no war, no peace” society has not been theoretically elaborated on. In 
response, this paper furnishes a theoretical framework for understanding the specific characteristics 
of “no war, no peace” societies, in particular the reproduction of institutions that generate conflict 
potential within and among societies. It also identifies core themes and issues that can be used for 
the operationalization and execution of empirical research. Finally, it examines the existing scientific 
knowledge of the consequences of long-lasting “no war, no peace” situations. The paper consists of 
four parts. The first part presents several conceptual approaches, which contribute to the study of 
“no war, no peace” societies. The second part discusses the analytical value of this concept. The 
next part explores institutional theory in relationship to “no war, no peace” societies. It asks why 
and how the reproduction of conflict potential takes place. The fourth part develops the 
methodology for this research project. The final part indicates possible/planned research outcomes of 
this INTAS-sponsored research project. 
Dieses working paper bietet einen theoretischen und methodologischen Rahmen zur Untersuchung 
des sozialen Aufbaus und der Konsequenzen von Gesellschaften in einem Zustand von „weder Krieg 
noch Frieden“ am Beispiel von Armenien und Aserbaidschan. Obwohl beide Staaten wiederholt als 
Gesellschaften im Zustand von „weder Krieg noch Frieden“ beschrieben wurden, fand dieses 
Konzept bis heute keine fundierte wissenschaftliche Aufarbeitung. Mit dieser Arbeit soll deshalb ein 
theoretischer Rahmen ausgearbeitet werden, um nicht nur die spezifischen Eigenschaften einer 
Gesellschaft im Zustand von „weder Krieg noch Frieden“, sondern auch die Reproduktion von 
Institutionen, die ein Konfliktpotenzial innerhalb und zwischen sozialen Gruppen erzeugen können, 
besser zu verstehen. Es werden in dieser Studie jedoch auch Kernthemen und Probleme identifiziert, 
die für die Operationalisierung und Realisierung der empirischen Forschung verwendet werden 
können. Zusätzlich wird der bisherige Forschungsstand zur Beschreibung der Folgen, die ein 
fortwährender Zustand von „weder Krieg noch Frieden“ auf Gesellschaften hat, präsentiert. Die 
vorliegende Studie besteht aus vier Teilen. Der erste Teil präsentiert mehrere konzeptuelle Ansätze, 
die zum Studium von Gesellschaften in einem Zustand von „weder Krieg noch Frieden“ beitragen. 
Der zweite Teil diskutiert den analytischen Wert dieses Konzepts. Der dritte Teil erforscht die 
Institutionstheorie in der Beziehung zu solchen Gesellschaften. Es wird untersucht, warum und wie 
die Reproduktion des Konfliktpotenzials stattfindet. Der vierte Teil entwickelt schliesslich eine 
Methodik für dieses Forschungsprojekt. Zum Abschluss folgt noch ein Überblick über die 
möglichen/geplanten Forschungsergebnisse dieses von INTAS gesponserten Forschungsprojektes. 
Cette recherche fournit un cadre théorique et méthodologique pour étudier la construction sociale et 
les conséquences d'une situation de "ni guerre, ni paix" - avec l'Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan comme 
exemples. Les chercheurs décrivent régulièrement ces deux pays comme des situations de "ni 
guerre, ni paix", mais jusqu'au présent le concept de "ni guerre, ni paix" n'a guère été élaboré 
théoriquement. En réponse, ce document de travail fournit un cadre théorique pour comprendre les 
caractéristiques spécifiques de la situation de "ni guerre, ni paix", et en particulier se focalise sur la 
reproduction des institutions qui crée un potentiel de conflit dans et parmi les sociétés. Cette 
recherche identifie aussi des thèmes de base et des questions qui peuvent être utilisés pour la mise 
en œuvre de futures recherches empiriques. Finalement, il examine l'état de la recherche à propos 
des conséquences des situations de "ni guerre, ni paix" de longue durée. Cette recherche est 
composée de quatre parties. La première partie présente plusieurs approches conceptuelles, qui 
contribuent à l'étude des situations de "ni guerre, ni paix". La deuxième partie discute de la valeur 
analytique du concept. La partie suivante explore la théorie institutionnelle en rapport avec les 
situations de "ni guerre, ni paix". La question de pourquoi et comment le potentiel de conflit se 
reproduit est notamment posée. La quatrième partie développe la méthodologie pour ce projet de 
recherche. Enfin, la dernière partie indique des résultats de recherche possibles/prévus de ce projet 
de recherche INTAS. 
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 Preface 
Heinz Krummenacher and Christian Gebhart1 
Armenians and Azeris have started increasingly to use the term “no war, no peace” to refer to their 
societies, and international scholars are also using the term to describe the societies of these states, 
which differ strongly from societies living either in a state of war or in one of peace. “No war, no 
peace” societies are continuously reproducing institutions that generate potential for conflict and 
thus undermine democratic transformation, conflict resolution and peacebuilding. 
The following study by Prof. Dr. Dennis Dijkzeul, published as a swisspeace Working Paper, Towards 
a Framework for the Study of “No War, No Peace” Societies, serves as the methodological 
background study for a larger research project - a comparative analysis of the Armenian and 
Azerbaijan societies.2 It offers a methodological framework for understanding the specific 
characteristics of “no war, no peace” societies. Armenia and Azerbaijan are illustrative of the 
contemporary challenge faced by societies caught in between conditions of instability, war and 
peace. 
The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over the region of Nagorny Karabakh has smouldered in a state of 
„no war, no peace” since the ceasefire of 1994. The conflict, which can be described as a clash 
between the principles of self-determination of peoples and the territorial integrity of states, is a 
central obstacle to the political development of Armenia and Azerbaijan, both of which so far have 
not succeeded to find productive ways for conflict transformation. Currently, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan are officially striving towards resolving the Nagorno Karabakh conflict by peaceful 
means. 
However it is not very likely that a comprehensive peace agreement can be reached in the 
foreseeable future. Still there is a persistent risk of increasing ceasefire violations, while both parties 
are engaged in an expensive arms race and are making martial statements that are received 
enthusiastically by major parts of the population. There are radical forces within government and 
opposition in both states which seek to maintain a certain level of public antagonism towards the 
other, and therefore it is essential to prevent this condition from reaching a crisis point. 
It is thus extremely important to promote the collaboration with and between both countries at the 
level of civil society, not only to create trust, but also to gain a better knowledge of the specific 
condition of each other’s society. We hope that the larger project, for which this paper was 
prepared, will contribute to this process. 
 
______________________ 
1 Heinz Krummenacher is Managing Director of swisspeace, and Program Director of FAST International, Bern. 
Christian Gebhart is research analyst for FAST International, responsible for South Caucasus.  
2  In spring 2006, scholars from the Centre for Regional Integration and Conflict Resolution (CRICR), Yerevan 
State University, applied to swisspeace for a joint study of the construction and dynamics of “no war, no 
peace” societies. After an in-depth assessment in September 2006, swisspeace and three partner institutes 
started the scientific research project “No War, No Peace” Society: Problems and Perspectives of Democratic 
Transformations, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding. The implementing partners are the Centre for 
Regional Integration and Conflict Resolution (CRICR) at Yerevan State University, Faculty of Sociology, 
Armenia, the Institute for Peace and Democracy (IPD), Baku, Azerbaijan, and the Institute for International 
Law of Peace and Armed Conflict (IFHV), Ruhr University Bochum, Germany. The application for conducting 
this research was submitted to INTAS (The International Association for the Promotion of Co-operation with 
Scientists from the Newly Independent States [NIS] of the Former Soviet Union) and was successfully 
approved for the duration of two years. 
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1 Introduction 
Despite the large number of societies that have suffered from war and have only reached incomplete 
peace, these “no war, no peace” societies have not yet received systematic attention in the social 
sciences. Our research attempts to fill this void, which is important because conflicts can always 
restart. Sometimes, conflict just lingers on as in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Angola with the 
(recurrent) possibility of new outbreaks of large-scale violence, as recently happened in Somalia.3 
But also in countries where warring parties did sign a peace agreement, about half of all civil wars 
resume.4 
This research paper provides a theoretical and methodological framework on the (on-going) social 
construction and consequences of “no war, no peace” societies with Armenia and Azerbaijan as 
examples. Scholars regularly describe these two countries as “no war, no peace” societies but to 
date the concept of “no war, no peace” society has not been elaborated on theoretically.5 Nor has it 
received sufficient empirical analysis that could lead to a more grounded theory. Therefore the 
current research has three aims, namely: 
1. to elaborate on a theoretical framework for understanding the specific characteristics of 
“no war, no peace” societies, in particular the reproduction of institutions that generate 
conflict potential within and among societies; 
2. to identify core themes and issues that can be used for the operationalization and 
execution of the empirical research; 
3. to examine the existing scientific knowledge of social consequences of long-lasting “no 
war, no peace” situations. 
The main research assumption is that a “no war, no peace” society continuously reproduces 
institutions, such as structures, formal organizations, informal groupings, as well as norms and 
values that generate conflict potential both within the society and among neighboring states. This 
reproduction of conflict potential undermines democratic transitions, conflict transformation, and 
economic development. 
This paper consists of four main parts. Part two introduces the concept of “no war, no peace” 
societies. It presents several approaches that can contribute to the study of such societies. Although 
these approaches provide important insights, none of them is specifically applicable to “no war, no 
peace” societies. Part three discusses the analytical value of the concept of a “no war, no peace” 
society. What is its added value and how does it differ from other, related concepts? The fourth part 
explores institutional theory in relationship to “no war, no peace” societies. It asks why and how the 
reproduction of conflict potential takes place. The fifth part discusses the methodology for this 
research project and indicates the planned research outcomes. 
 
______________________ 
3  An earlier version of this paper was prepared as a background document for the International Expert 
Conference: Towards A Methodological Framework for the Study of “No War, No Peace” Societies: The Case 
of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict, Ruhr University 
Bochum, 6-8 October 2006, Bochum. This conference was part of the current research project, which was 
generously sponsored by INTAS. 
4  Hanlon, J. 2006: 200 wars and the humanitarian response. In: H. Yanacopulos and J. Hanlon (eds.) Civil War, 
Civil Peace. Oxford: James Currey, pp. 18-48. 
5  De Waal, Th. 2003: Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War. New York/London: New 
York University Press, pp. 251- 268. Goodhand, J. 2006: Aiding Peace? The Role of NGOs in Armed Conflict. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 19. International Crisis Group 2006: Conflict Resolution in the South 
Caucasus: The EU’s Role. Europe Report No. 173. 20 March 2006, p. 2. 
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2  “No War, No Peace” Societies 
Whereas a vast amount of research and literature has been devoted to the analysis of economic 
change and democratic transformation of post-war states, almost no international scholarly 
attention has focused on the specific characteristics of “no war, no peace” societies. Conclusions 
from a specific post-war reconstruction and democratization approach in one country are hardly 
applicable to those countries whose conflicts and transitions took different trajectories. In addition, 
it is often assumed that a peacebuilding process ends with the establishment of an election 
mechanism along with the introduction of some economic recovery package. Relatively little analysis 
has been made of how institutions and political transitions are either undermined or strengthened by 
the specific characteristics of “no war, no peace” societies. In response, this project examines how 
the institutions and their transformations influence the social fabric of “no war, no peace” societies 
and analyzes the prospects for peacebuilding and democratization. 
As there is only a small amount of literature available on the specific characteristics of “no war, no 
peace” societies, this research framework draws from existing literature on humanitarian affairs, 
war, security, conflict and peacebuilding. The current literature can be grouped into three related - 
and partially overlapping - categories: 
• Research on the evolving characteristics of violent conflict. This category can be subdivided into 
five subthemes: 
- Violent conflict as the new barbarism; an irrational phenomenon that deviates from and 
destroys a society’s path to modernity;6 
- Violent conflict as an identity-based phenomenon with ethnic and religious sources; 
- Violent conflict as a Malthusian phenomenon based on resource scarcity; 
- Violent conflict as an economically rational social phenomenon, for example in the debate 
on greed and grievance, and the political economy of war;7 
- Violent conflict as an anthropological and sociological phenomenon;8 
• Violent conflict as both an international and local security issue; 
• Violent conflict as a problem that can be solved through conflict transformation, peacebuilding 
and international interventions. 
All these perspectives were by and large developed in reaction to the changing forms of conflict, 
often civil war, after the end of the Cold War. Initially, the demise of superpower rivalry had raised 
hopes for a better functioning of the United Nations, an end to the proxy conflicts supported by the 
superpowers, and more robust peacekeeping. In short, many people hoped to cash in on a global 
 
______________________ 
6  Kaplan, R.D. 2000: The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War. New York: Random 
House. 
7  Collier P. and A. Hoeffler 1998: On Economic Causes of Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers 50, pp. 563-573. 
Reno, W. 1998: Warlord Politics and African States. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher. Kaldor, M. 2001: New 
and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
8  Richards, P. 2005: No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts. Athens: Ohio 
University Press. 
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peace dividend. In general, interstate conflict declined but intra-state conflict in the poorest 
countries increased and gained more media and public attention.9 
2.1 Concepts of Violent Conflict in Historical Perspective 
Although the end of the Cold War helped terminate some violent conflicts, for example in Central 
America, other conflicts arose or intensified as in Africa’s Great Lakes Region and the South 
Caucasus. In countries where (civil) wars began during the Cold War but lasted long after outsiders 
lost interest, as in Afghanistan and Angola in the late 1990’s, the political economy of war changed. 
Resource extraction and asset stripping became more important than the earlier superpower support 
as a resource base for conflict. Some countries like Somalia oscillated between a state of war and 
only slightly more peaceful warlord politics. Some parts of the country, however, such as Somaliland 
and Puntland, remained relatively peaceful and were able to rebuild themselves to some extent. 
Other countries, such as Colombia and Sri Lanka, maintained capable state institutions in relatively 
peaceful areas but were unable to end armed conflict in other parts of their territories. In a large 
number of states a combination of corrupt politics, weak governance, economic decline, diminishing 
international support, cheap weapons and local tensions caused or refueled conflicts so that long-
lasting “no war, no peace” situations arose. 
It is important to notice that each of these situations has its own unique characteristics. 
Nevertheless, they share some commonalities. The first is that the roads these conflicts take are 
often tortuous and their complexity and dynamics often baffle outside observers. Secondly, collective 
action (in particular through state and civil society institutions) is weakened. Thirdly, in order to 
understand the conflict’s roots and why they have become so chronic, we must examine the 
strategies and tactics used by political elites, warlords, and other groups to gain or retain power, as 
well as to obtain resources (financial, material, diplomatic, symbolic, etc.). Understanding both the 
roots and changing nature of these conflicts helps us understand the weaknesses and strengths of 
international and local peacebuilding and democratization efforts. 
The New Barbarism 
The first reaction to the spate of “internal” civil conflicts during and after 1989 was to perceive these 
conflicts as deviations from peaceful normality. Robert Kaplan described how social and economic 
changes, in addition to a resurgence of tribalism and ancient hatreds, caused clashes that would lead 
to a “coming anarchy” marked by an inevitable fragmentation of societies.10 
 
 
 
______________________ 
9  Collier P. (et al.) 2003: Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. Washington, DC and 
Oxford: World Bank and Oxford University Press, pp. 5-11. According to Collier, the number of civil conflicts - 
“an identifiable rebel organization challenges the government militarily and the resulting violence results in 
more than 1,000 combat-related deaths, with at least 5 percent on each side” - has risen substantially over 
the last forty years, peaking around 1989. “For most of the world’s population development has been 
significantly reducing risks, but a significant minority of people live in low-income countries that have not 
shared in development. For them the risks have been increasing.” For a critical review of the problems with 
counting the numbers of war, see Hanlon 2006: 200 wars and the humanitarian response. In: Yanacopulos 
and Hanlon (eds.) Civil War, Civil Peace, pp. 18-48. 
10  Robert D. Kaplan’s The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War is often interpreted in 
this vein. Surprisingly, when Kaplan writes about tribalism, he actually treats Huntington’s clash of 
civilizations thesis. 
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Similarly, other authors interpreted war as a disruption of positive, natural development processes.11 
Hence, these conflicts were irrational - consequences of a developmental collapse and a breakdown 
of communication.12 The inevitable fragmentation, anarchy and irrationality would make it difficult 
for outsiders to intervene successfully in these conflicts. The upshot of Kaplan’s thesis for 
international policy-making was that there was little that could be done about these conflicts 
because they were mainly caused by endogenous factors that were hard to influence.13 
Identity Based Conflict 
The next strand of theory emphasized that identity conflicts were perhaps not rational in their 
consequences. The motivations could nevertheless be understood more rationally as part of identity 
politics. Hence, conflicts in places like Bosnia, Rwanda and Nagorno-Karabakh were said to stem 
from old ethnic or religious tensions and aimed at exterminating or disempowering specific ethnic or 
religious groups.14 
A related vein of theory (on a worldwide scale) was proposed by the American political scientist 
Samuel Huntington.15 He suggested that with the Cold War over a new type of international conflict 
became more dominant: The Clash of Civilizations. He especially focused on conflict of the “West” 
with the “Confucian East” and the “Islamic World.” 
Both types of identity-based explanations of violent conflict received fierce criticism. First, they were 
considered too deterministic. People can have multiple loyalties and some of these will transcend 
ethnic or religious differences. Empirically, some ethnically diverse states, such as Zambia, were 
better able to contain ethnic conflict than countries with only a few ethnic groups, e.g., Rwanda. 
Moreover, “Kaplan’s worst-case scenario failed to materialize: barbaric African wars did not spill 
uncontrollably over boarders and create havoc among peaceful and unsuspecting neighbors. If 
anything, the reverse is the case. In much of Africa it is the neighbors who inflame local conflicts by 
venturing across borders, seeking to control what might otherwise be quite localized fighting. Cases 
in point are Nigerian and Guinean peacekeeping activities in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Ethiopian and 
Eritrean support for opposing militias in Somalia, and most obvious of all, the role of six neighboring 
countries (…) in the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”16 In short, the identity-based 
approach may actually obscure analysis of the various grounds for and impacts of the conflict. 
 
______________________ 
11  For an early critique, see Duffield, M. 1994: Complex Emergencies and the Crisis of Developmentalism. IDS 
Bulletin 4, pp. 37–45. 
12  Duffield, M. 2000: Globalization, Transborder Trade and War Economies. In: M. Berdal and M. David (eds.), 
Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 74. 
13  Kaplan’s thesis is said to have contributed to the long inaction by the Clinton Administration during the 
conflicts in former Yugoslavia. 
14  For example, Francis Deng, the former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on displaced 
persons, argued in 1993 that “[t]he gist of the new internal conflicts is that the ethnic pieces put together by 
colonial glue and reinforced by the old world order are now pulling apart and reasserting their autonomy. Old 
identities rendered dormant by the structures and values of the nation-state system, are reemerging and 
redefining the standards of political participation, distribution of goods and services and government 
legitimacy.” F.M. Deng, (1993). Protecting the Dispossessed: A Challenge for the International Community. 
Washington, DC, p. 115, quoted in K.A. Maynard, (1999). Healing Communities in Conflict: International 
Assistance in Complex Emergencies. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 3. Maynard also puts a strong 
emphasis on identity. 
15  Huntington, S.P. 1997: The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. London: The Free Press. 
16  Richards 2005: No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, pp. 8-9. 
“No War, No Peace” Societies 
  7 
 
Malthusian Problems 
The idea of (civil) war driven by population growth and the resulting environmental scarcity was 
written by Thomas Homer Dixon in 1994. “Around the same time, a number of writers predicted 
wars over the growing shortages of fresh water.”17 Richards summarizes their position as “Malthus 
with guns.”18 
However, “later research showed that there does not appear to be a convincing case that 
environmental factors cause major violent conflicts which in turn lead to massive flows of forced 
migrants.”19 Moreover, resource-rich countries, such as Angola and Sierra Leone, also turned out to 
be conflict ridden. Could it not be that scarcity of justice was actually a larger problem than scarcity 
of resources? Finally, the search for a specific set of resource-based or other causes of war failed to 
take into account that the motivations for conflict - economic or otherwise - also evolve over time. In 
brief, there were so many mitigating and exogenous factors that the simple Malthusian perspective 
was disregarded and resource scarcity came to be seen as only one possible contributing factor to 
conflict. 
Political Economy of War 
With the benefit of hindsight, the Malthusian perspective on war can be considered a simplified 
version of the political economy of war approach to conflict. In the latter half of the 1990’s, deeper 
analysis showed that ethnic and religious identity as well as resource scarcity were not the only 
factors triggering violence nor were they always the primary factors. The causes of war, or at least 
the motivations of fighting factions, were first discussed in the greed and grievance debate. Was war 
about groups who illegally tried to gain a better economic position (greed) or were groups trying to 
redress grievances? Or were grievance arguments used to justify greed?20 For some groups war 
turned out to be a way to survive or to gain power and status. 
In a play on the words of military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz, David Keen illuminated the 
changing understanding of the political economy of war when he wrote, “War may be a 
continuation of economics by other means.”21 Many contemporary civil wars are not about winning 
or imposing one party’s (political) will as in Clausewitzian war among states; rather, they are about 
controlling a steady flow of resources. Private control over trade and assets instead of territory is 
becoming a defining quality of political power in many conflicts (but not all). Such control can take 
place in both resource-rich (e.g., the DRC) and resource-scarce (e.g., Somalia) environments. 
As the political economy of war becomes increasingly based on resource extraction and asset 
stripping, hostile groups rely less and less “on generating popular legitimacy to sustain
 
______________________ 
17  Hanlon 2006: 200 Wars and the Humanitarian Response. In: Yanacopulos and Hanlon (eds.) Civil War, Civil 
Peace, pp. 18-48. 
18  Richards 2005: No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts. 
19  Hanlon 2006: 200 Wars and the Humanitarian Response. In: Yanacopulos and Hanlon (eds.), Civil War, Civil 
Peace, pp. 18-48. 
20  Berdal M. and Malone D.M. (eds.) 2000: Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. 
Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Collier (et al.) 2003: Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and 
Development Policy. 
21  Keen, D. 2000: Incentives and Disincentives for Violence. In: M. Berdal and D.M. Malone (eds.), Greed and 
Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
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themselves.”22 This not only affects the internal cohesion of fighting forces but also their relationship 
with the local population. 
Disciplined standing armies, controlled either by a strong government or dominant ideology, have 
become rarer so that combatants depend less on steady payments from the state to earn a living. 
Hence, loyalty to a state or leader has decreased and armed groups fragment into smaller factions 
with weak command-and-control structures. Their relative autonomy is further reinforced by the 
proliferation of small, cheap arms. Because they frequently lack a strong internal hierarchy, these 
groups (often marauding bands) are difficult for their commanders or international patrons to 
control. Furthermore, such groups do not engage in direct battles to destroy their opponents or 
conquer territory but prefer to plunder for a living, which results in chronic crises. Whereas standing 
armies are public institutions, these groups operate more as private enterprises. During the conflict 
in the Former Yugoslavia, Croatian and Serbian fighters, for example, at times coordinated their 
fighting to avoid pitched battles over territory, allowing them to control and manipulate the local 
population.23 On the border of Tajikistan and Afghanistan as well as in Bosnia villages were 
destroyed but electrical wires remained unscathed because all parties engaged in the conflict needed 
electricity.24 In Sierra Leone and Liberia child soldiers sometimes operated on their own or in small 
groups plundering to stay alive. The increasing fragmentation makes it extremely difficult to identify 
the different forces controlling territory, to negotiate with them and to ensure that humanitarian law 
and agreements regarding humanitarian access and conflict resolution are adhered to.25 
Because asset predation and resource extraction are becoming central goals, fighters resort to 
strategies such as ethnic cleansing, rape and mass murder to engender fear and create mass 
population movements. Therefore the number of civilian casualties, refugees and IDPs tends to be 
very high.26 When people flee they leave behind most of their possessions, which are stolen in their 
absence. Moreover, their departure, death, or subjugation prevents them from upholding claims on 
their land and natural resources. In this way identity conflicts can be started or exploited for 
economic and political gain. Frequently, when people take up arms in these kinds of conflicts the 
distinction between armed groups and civilians and between perpetrators and victims is blurred.27 In 
addition, fighting can become a survival strategy for those at the bottom of society who lack other 
economic opportunities; this is particularly true for young unemployed men. 
 
______________________ 
22  Macrae J. (ed.) 2002: The New Humanitarianisms: A Review of Trends in Global Humanitarian Action. HPG 
Report 11, April 2002, p. 5. 
23  Kaldor, M. 2001: New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
24  Anderson 1999: Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - or War. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, p. 26. 
25  Macrae 2002: The New Humanitarianisms: A Review of Trends in Global Humanitarian Action, p. 5. 
26  To some extent, this is a disputed claim. During the Rwandan genocide, victims were killed at a faster rate 
than during the Holocaust. In all likelihood, the speed and number of people killed varies highly from crisis to 
crisis. In chronic crises, the breakdown of health, agricultural, transport, and educational systems contributes 
to high morbidity and mortality rates. Hence, it is difficult to make general claims. 
27  According to Terry, the “distinction between combatants and non-combatants disappeared with the advent 
of aerial warfare. Bombs dropped on cities throughout the Second World War did not discriminate between 
targets.” It might even be that this distinction already blurred in the “nineteenth century, when small 
professional armies were replaced by enormous conscript armies, and casualty rates among non-combatants 
rose dramatically.” Nevertheless, this distinction took place in the context of war among strong states. The 
blurring we discuss is the effect of fragmented armed groups, resource extraction and asset stripping, 
together with manipulated ethnic or religious grievances in weak states. F. Terry, (2002). Condemned to 
Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, p. 11. 
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When conflicts last long and violence becomes chronic, people’s coping mechanisms diminish; 
unable to rely on the state for protection, security and other services, people retreat into their 
families, communities, clans, or ethnic groups. They become increasingly afraid to trust others. For 
the local population, the political economy of war makes life, if not survival, increasingly difficult. 
As the political economy of war approach evolved, it increasingly began to stress differences in state 
institutions’ - and state officials’ - capacity in preventing or dealing with conflict. Crucial differences 
existed among the crises in terms of each state’s capacity to stem the conflict and the wealth in 
natural resources that could be fueling the conflict. Some states, including Colombia and Sri Lanka, 
had relatively capable governmental institutions and diversified economies but still were not able to 
defeat insurgents. “Others - Congo, Angola and Sudan - [were] resource-rich states whose elites 
[were] incapable or unwilling to develop their countries and end civil wars.”28 Still others, like 
Somalia, were weak states with poor resource endowments that could not provide effective 
governance. Though state capacities and the extent of state failure differed in each crisis, the crises 
shared at least three overlapping characteristics: 
1. a government that was not accountable to (segments of) its population; 
2. a breakdown of government services including the ability to provide protection to the 
population, which in particular refers to an inability to maintain a Weberian monopoly on 
physical coercion within the national borders and the breakdown of the monetary 
monopoly; 
3. and a conflict that although a disaster for most members of society, benefited others; 
warlords, militias and governing elites often manipulated these conflicts to their own 
political and economic advantage. 
In other words, a hidden order existed behind the disorder. This was captured in terms like the 
criminalization of the state patronage,29 warlord politics30 and the political economy of war31 in weak 
and failed states.32 These terms refer to the use of violence and other extra-legal methods by groups, 
generally elites, who either run the state institutions or attempt to capture them for their own 
private enrichment and political gain. These groups use public power and when possible, the 
trappings of sovereignty to control production and market channels. Through the corruption of these 
groups, the state weakens and the majority of the population suffers.33 In the end conflict ensues 
and because these groups live off the conflict, peace is hard to establish. 
 
______________________ 
28  Ignatieff, M. 2002: Intervention and State Failure. Dissent, 2002, p. 117. 
29  Davidson, B. 1992: Africa en de Vloek van de Natie-Staat: The Black Man´s Burden. Amsterdam: NOVIB/Mets; 
J. Bayart, S. Ellis and B. Hibou, (1999). The Criminalization of the State in Africa. Bloomington & Indianapolis, 
Oxford: James Currey, Indiana University Press; P. Chabal and J. Daloz, (1999). Africa Works: Disorder as 
Political Instrument. Oxford, James Currey. 
30  Reno, W. 1998: Warlord Politics and African States. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
31  Keen, D. 1998: The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars. Adelphi Paper 320:88; Kaldor (2001). New 
and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era; Berdal and Malone (eds.) (2000). Greed and Grievance: 
Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Macrae (ed.) 2002: The New Humanitarianisms: A Review of Trends. In 
Global Humanitarian Action. 
32  Rotberg, R.I. (ed.) 2003: State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror. Cambridge and Washington, 
DC: World Peace Foundation and Brookings Institution Press. 
33  Reno, W. 2000: Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars. In: M. Berdal and D.M. Malone (eds.) 
2000. Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 
44–45. 
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A strong point of the political economy of war approach was that it did not just look for “barbarian” 
or “Malthusian” causes of conflict but treated conflict increasingly as a process, so that it could pay 
attention to changing motivations behind the conflict.34 Nevertheless, as the political economy 
approach evolved and took the state into account, it faced several theoretical challenges. First, as 
conflict became more chronic, the distinction between peace and war became less clear. Violence 
often continued after the signing of a peace agreement and many conflicts flared up after more or 
less peaceful periods. Similarly, it became difficult to distinguish the actual difference(s) between an 
expanded concept of the political economy of war and war itself. 
Violent Conflict as an Anthropological/Sociological Issue 
The above perspectives share the view that war is an aberration. Nevertheless, just as war or chronic 
conflict can be seen as alternative forms of political economy, they can also be seen as alternative 
social systems. In this sense peace and war are not clear-cut phenomena; instead, they can be 
placed on a continuum of social action in which they are an intimate part of the daily life of many 
people. Richards writes: 
“new war” needs to be understood in relation to patterns of violence already 
embedded within society. The way to tackle this aspect of the subject is through the 
ethnography of practice. Careful analysis of what people do, and how they do it - for 
example, in carrying out “bush” campaigns or organizing ethnic killing - may help to 
establish what conflict is about.35 
He argues that such a “practice orientation as a means to keep a focus on two rather distinctive 
aspects of the anthropological study of lethal violence – the strategic/instrumental approach (…) 
and an approach which engages with symbolic and expressive/emotional aspects.”36 He further 
stresses:  
War belongs within society [and] that mono-causal perspectives (whether stressing 
resource competition, material motivation, economics or symbolic aspects of 
violence) are ultimately unsatisfactory. (…) careful comparative analysis of 
ethnographic evidence establishes no single explanation of war. War only makes 
sense as an aspect of social process. The best analytical approach to war as process is 
through the ethnography of actual practices of war and peace.37 
In short, the anthropological approach addresses more the question of “how do people make war 
and peace” than exploring (mono-causal) triggers of war. Thus war loses its unique and isolated 
character of human evil and becomes recognized as a (possible) extreme expression of sets of 
dangers facing us all.38 This approach also broadens the scope of research further by incorporating 
symbolic factors, as well as local perceptions into its analysis. The difference between the 
anthropological and sociological approaches is in name only. Both can share the same 
methodological approaches but anthropology focuses more on conflict within other societies and 
 
______________________ 
34  Richards argues about the econometric analysis by one of the main authors in the greed and grievance 
debate, Collier, that several of his economic variables can better be seen as political variables and that this 
mistake at the very least partially weakens Collier’s conclusions. Richards 2005: No Peace, No War: An 
Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts. 
35  Ibid., p. 11. 
36  Ibid. 
37  Ibid., p. 12. 
38  Ibid., p. 14. 
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sociology on conflicts within one’s own society. Their similarities are therefore more important than 
their differences. 
The anthropological approach usually depends on the quality of long periods of fieldwork. It is, 
however, an open question whether other data collection methods or a combination of them can 
also reveal more about a specific conflict, especially if people from conflict countries themselves are 
involved. 
2.2 Security 
Just as the understanding of conflict and humanitarian crises evolved at the international level, it 
also changed at the subnational level. The international debates on security reflect this. 
 Security at the International Level 
In line with the changing conceptions of conflict, interpretation of the concept of security underwent 
a change at the international political level to include economic and social determinants of conflict. 
Traditionally, security is conceived in terms of relations, in particular military ones, between 
sovereign states.39 The armed forces are a central tool in enforcing and protecting state security. A 
limited vision of security is based on military power to safeguard the state and its population against 
invasion or other threats, for example through deterrence and defense. The armed forces constitute 
a crucial component of the state’s internal monopoly on legitimate coercion. 
With Boutros Boutros Ghali’s Agenda for Peace, this state-centered understanding of security gave 
way to a concept of peace, which featured the individual; human security became a new, ill-defined 
topic in the UN system.40 In the 1990’s, the UN Security Council (UNSC) became more attentive to 
non-state actors and held special sessions with major humanitarian NGOs to discuss their 
experiences and perspectives. Humanitarian organizations - NGOs and UN agencies - jumped at the 
chance to influence the UN Security Council, which included humanitarian issues on its agenda, 
alongside more long-term structural threats to international security, such as environment and 
HIV/AIDS. The UNSC also became more active with two other forms of non-military intervention: 
sanctions and international criminal prosecutions. In addition, it increasingly perceived civil war and 
internal strife as potential threats to international security, which meant these conditions could form 
the basis for enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. “This development was 
virtually inconceivable during the Cold War, when similar conflicts were not considered to constitute 
such threats.”41 
 
 
______________________ 
39  Of course, the term security has also been applied to the field of espionage. 
40  Boutros-Ghali B. 1995: An Agenda for Peace. New York: United Nations. 
41  Weiss T.G. and Hubert D. (eds.) 2001: The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background. 
Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, p. 119. This development has continued with the UN 
reform process. See for example, the suggestions proposed by Kofi Annan’s High Level Panel in 2004: United 
Nations General Assembly 2004: A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility - Report of the High-level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. A/59/565, New York: United Nations; and the subsequent reports: 
United Nations General Assembly (2005). In: Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human 
Right for All. A/59/2005, New York: United Nations; and United Nations General Assembly (2005). Resolution 
adopted by the General Assembly: 60/1. 2005 World Summit Outcome. A/Res/60/1, New York: United 
Nations. 
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In addition, “for a growing number of states the security of individuals is becoming a foreign policy 
priority in its own right.”42 In humanitarian circles and foreign policy establishments, “human 
security” rapidly gained currency. Human security in its more restricted definition means “freedom 
from pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety, or even their lives. Though the state remains 
the principal provider of security, it is seen in instrumental terms - as a means to an end, rather than 
the end itself. In the face of repression or weak states, advocates of human security argue that 
international actors have a responsibility to come to the aid of populations at risk.”43 
Similarly, the “responsibility to protect”44 loosens traditional interpretations of sovereignty.45 In 
other words, there is - in theory at least - a broadening from “security of state” to “security of 
people,” which frequently also includes addressing social and economic inequality within or among 
countries. However, this broadening is definitely not complete and many strong states prefer 
realpolitik to further their interests. At the same time, various developing countries fear that human 
security may lead to unwelcome interventions and other forms of political pressure from outsiders.46 
 Security at the National Level - and Below 
As many of the post-Cold War conflicts occurred at the (sub-) national level as forms of civil unrest 
or civil war, some of the security concepts that were used to study conflicts between states in 
general and the superpowers in particular were being adapted to understand conflict at local levels. 
For instance, when an empire disintegrates, the anarchy (or at least the absence of hierarchical 
order). that realist international relations scholars usually assume at the international level, all of a 
sudden takes place within and among newly formed states. One of these international concepts was 
the so-called security dilemma.47 This concept explains how states as rational actors that do not 
want to start a conflict can nevertheless end up in conflict as they attempt to preempt military action 
by another state and strike first. 
Strictly speaking, the security dilemma is currently less useful in the case of Azerbaijan and Armenia 
because armed conflict has already taken place. It does, however, more generally help highlight the 
importance of understanding national security and concomitant security measures, such as military 
mobilization, arms races (either for deterrence or offense) and possible strikes due to the changing 
power balance. In addition, a security-based perspective pays attention to international power 
 
______________________ 
42  Weiss and Hubert 2001: The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background, p. 11. 
43  Ibid. 
44  In the discussion on when to intervene, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
moved the discussion from the reasons for states to intervene to a debate on the responsibility of the state to 
take care of its citizens. It introduced the concept of “the responsibility to protect,” indicating that sovereign 
states should protect their own citizens from genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other crimes against humanity. 
If they abdicate this responsibility through incapacity or ill will, it shifts to the wider international community. 
International Crisis Group (2006). Press release. October 2006. Hence, attention shifts from state security to 
the rights of its citizens. 
45  Canadian officials, e.g. Lloyd Axworthy, have played a leading role in the development of both “the 
responsibility to protect” and human security. It is therefore no surprise that both terms overlap conceptually. 
Axworthy L. 2000: Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First.” Global Governance 7(1), 
pp. 19-23. 
46  Ayoob, M. 2004: Third World Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention and International Administration. 
Global Governance 10 (1), pp. 99-118. 
47  Melander, E. 1999: Anarchy Within: The Security Dilemma between Ethnic Groups in Emerging Anarchy. 
Report No. 52, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala: Uppsala University. Roe, P. 1999: The 
Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as Tragedy? Journal of Peace Research 36 (2), pp. 183-202. 
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games, coalition formation, and less visible influences. Could it be that “no war, no peace” societies 
get caught in recurring security dilemmas? Understanding a security perspective also raises 
awareness of the need for a “toolbox” for preventing and ending armed conflict from the 
perspective of fighting forces and other combatants, as well as their national and international allies 
and sponsors. Tools vary from Security Sector Reform (SSR), Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration (DDR),48 confidence building measures, and international diplomatic efforts at peace 
negotiations. At the same time, the military balance of power needs to be taken into account on a 
continuous basis. If well executed, these tools overlap with or can become part of conflict 
transformation and peacebuilding. 
2.3 Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding  
In line with the evolving literature on understanding different types of conflict and their evolution, a 
new theory was also developed on ways to address these conflicts. The field of conflict 
transformation and peacebuilding mushroomed. A complete treatment of all the different 
approaches to conflict transformation and peacebuilding falls outside the scope of this framework 
paper. In general, conflict transformation and peacebuilding have grown in scope, ambition, and 
frequency of application after the end of the Cold War. Richards describes a central trend:  
Conflict resolution was once largely a matter of negotiation by leaders and diplomats. 
Where states have collapsed, or weak leadership is part of the problem, other 
approaches need to be tried. This has led to so-called Track Two negotiation 
processes, i.e. addressing wider aspects of a conflict at the same time as leaders 
negotiate a political deal. The aim of this work is not conflict resolution, but conflict 
transformation, such as, re-directing the social energies deployed in war to problem-
solving ventures on a cooperative basis.49 
Whereas the approaches discussed in earlier sections often focus at the policy level in their 
recommendations and rarely involve taking direct action towards trying to end the conflict or 
mitigate its consequences, conflict transformation and peacebuilding want to play a positive role in 
addressing the conflict. These activities can take place at all levels of society, as well as with many 
different groups within and among societies. Conflict transformation and peacebuilding approaches 
take the social process aspects of war and peace very seriously. Hence, conflict transformation and 
peacebuilding tools frequently dovetail with analyses of the political economy of war and 
anthropological approaches because these approaches are also multi-causal and process oriented. 
The next section draws the main conclusion from the conceptual debates described above. 
2.4 Conflicting Conclusions 
Whereas none of the above approaches fits our research program perfectly, all of these approaches 
can contribute to our research. In summary, the important lessons learned are: 
• The “new barbarism” sees conflict as a form of irrational behavior. However, the other 
perspectives progressively stress that conflict can have its own type(s) of rationality. It is 
therefore intelligible and in principle, can be transformed. 
 
 
______________________ 
48  Currently, it is becoming increasingly common to speak of DDRRR, which stands for Disarmament, 
Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement. 
49  Richards 2005: No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, p. 18. 
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• The “new barbarism,” “neo Malthusian” and “identity-based” approaches tend to see violent 
conflict - either from a descriptive or prescriptive point of view - as an exceptional state of 
affairs. They tend to focus on only one or a few aspects of violent conflict without placing these 
conflicts in their broad historical and societal context. Security approaches see armed conflict 
(and the possibility of it) as a common state of affairs. The political economy of war, 
ethnographic and peacebuilding approaches place conflict in its broader context and 
increasingly perceive war as a multi-causal social process. In different ways, they also stress that 
conflicts and the motivation(s) for them can evolve over time. 
• The perception of war and peace as social processes also implies that there is no clear-cut 
distinction between war and peace. Hence, a “no war, no peace” society can be seen as a social 
system, among other possible social systems. 
• The problem of distinguishing between the political economy of war and war itself indicates the 
importance of disaggregating conflicts. 
- Many different types of conflict exist. Civil war, inter-state war, coups d’état, urban violence, 
terrorism, ethnic cleansing, genocide, crime, and skirmishing can partially overlap but should 
not be uncritically put together as related or similar types of conflict. 
- Within one conflict different overlapping or recurring stages can be distinguished over time.  
- Within an on-going conflict, there may be pockets or periods of tranquility. 
- Within one conflict, there may also be institutions that mitigate the conflict and resist the 
divisions it causes.50 
All the approaches mentioned above could generally do a better job in delineating and 
disaggregating different types of conflict. The goal should not be a static list of different types of 
conflict but a better understanding of the manifold ways in which war and peace are socially 
constructed over time. Ideally, different local perspectives should be captured in order to understand 
and address the conflict more comprehensively. 
• To understand the conflict’s roots and why conflicts have become so chronic, we must examine 
the strategies and tactics used by political elites, warlords, and other groups to gain or retain 
power, as well as to obtain resources (financial, material, diplomatic, symbolic, etc.). The two 
central issues in many conflicts - weak state capacities and suboptimal collective action by other 
actors - are hard to address. What they have in common is that they both show a weakening of 
those institutions that could foster peace and support democratization, as well as a concomitant 
strengthening of those institutions that could intensify conflict or lead to a longer duration of 
the conflict. 
• The methods of study among the different approaches differs from mainly descriptive accounts - 
with a few normative conclusions on the futility of outside intervention - of the “new 
barbarism” to the economic quantitative tools and case studies in the political economy of war 
to in-depth field studies in the ethnographic approach. All these approaches can, in principle, 
shed light on the conflict(s) studied. Hence, a good study of conflict has to combine several 
methodological approaches in order to better understand the different, evolving aspects of 
conflict. 
 
______________________ 
50 Anderson 1999: Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - or War. 
“No War, No Peace” Societies 
  15 
 
• Finally, conflict, relief, rehabilitation, and development, as well as crisis prevention and conflict 
transformation can all occur simultaneously (but obviously not necessarily in harmony). 
The preceding sections made several references to societies where neither positive peace nor full-out 
war occur but where violent conflict may recur anytime. They demonstrated that several related, 
partially overlapping theoretical debates took place. While these debates are important for 
describing and analyzing societies caught in conflict, they do not show the analytical value of the 
concept of “no war, no peace” societies. The next section discusses what needs to be done to make 
the “no war, no peace” concept useful, in particular by challenging it empirically, which is what this 
research team will do in Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
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3 The Analytical Value of “No War, No Peace” 
Societies 
Does the concept of “no war, no peace” societies really add something new or is it just old wine in 
new bottles? This question has become steadily more pressing as Armenians and Azeris have started 
to use the term “no war, no peace” to describe their societies. Several international authors have 
also used the term to describe Armenian and Azeri societies.51 Is this just a local phenomenon or 
does this have a broader sociological value? 
Recently, Hanlon and Yanaocopulos,52 Richards,53 and Mac Ginty54 published books with “no war, no 
peace” in their titles, which did not specifically analyze the Azeri-Armenian situation. 
Hanlon and Yanacopulos essentially provide an introductory overview of many issues related to 
humanitarian and peacebuilding interventions. Despite the similarity in title, it is only tangentially 
related to this research project due to its emphasis on outside interventions. 
Mac Ginty provides a critical overview of peacebuilding approaches. He argues that the 
implementation of peace accords has often become “a technocratic exercise of tacking boxes, 
counting heads and weapons, amending constitutions, and reconstructing housing units, while the 
more thorny affective and perceptual issues of reconciliation, exclusion, and the restoration of 
dignity are left unaddressed.”55 Although he moves towards a broader sociological understanding of 
societies in conflict, his approach still centers on interventions from abroad and their role in 
improving the effectiveness of peace accords. 
Richards, as described above, indicates the value of a process approach and field-level 
anthropological research to societies in conflict. His approach is definitely valuable to our research 
but his focus on specific cases does not yet lead to a fuller understanding of “no war, no peace” 
societies. Through anthropological field work Richards shows the importance of understanding 
different forms of conflict within different societies but he does not develop a sociological theory. His 
work is still conflict oriented. 
Hence, we now need to develop a theory of societal change due to latent or low-intensity conflict 
that may intensify at any time. We should thus surpass terms as frozen conflict and negative peace 
and ask how broader society is changing. In sum, we argue that the strong focus on conflict (and 
when possible ending it) fails to indicate systemic changes in how broader society - and not just 
conflict parties or elites - develops. Building on a suggestion by Prof. Harutyunyan, we can 
schematically indicate the place of the “no war, no peace” concept in comparison with and 
corresponding to several other concepts of war and peace.56 
 
 
______________________ 
51  De Waal, 2003: Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, pp. 251-268; Goodhand 
2006: Aiding Peace? The Role of NGOs in Armed Conflict. p. 19; International Crisis Group, (2006). Conflict 
Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Role, p. 2. 
52  Yanacopulos H. and Hanlon J. (eds.) 2006: Civil War, Civil Peace. Milton Keynes and Oxford, The Open 
University in association with James Currey. 
53  Richards 2005: No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts. 
54  Mac Ginty, R. 2006: No War, No Peace: The Rejuvenation of Stalled Peace Processes and Peace Accords. 
Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. 
55  Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
56  Harutyunyan, L. 2006: personal correspondence. 
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Model I: Different Stages of War and Peace 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
War    Frozen Conflict/Negative Peace  Positive Peace 
 
Model II: Societal Models of War and Peace 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Society at War  No War, No Peace Society   Peaceful Society 
 
Galtung’s theory of peace present three stages of peace and conflict: full-out war, negative peace, 
and positive peace. Negative peace is the absence of direct violence but may endure unjust societal 
relations marked by structural violence, such as poverty and racism. With positive peace, structural 
violence has been eradicated. If an armed conflict cannot find a resolution, then it is common to 
speak of a frozen conflict between two or more parties. Our research differs in its broader societal 
approach. We describe how society itself changes. 
In summary, this research project follows the most basic tenet from sociology: “no war, no peace” 
societies are social phenomena in their own right. Our study is based on the assumption that a “no 
war, no peace” society constitutes a complex and dynamic social system in which institutions 
become reproduced with a potential for - positive or negative - conflict transformation. 
Still, for the “no war, no peace” concept to be useful, it requires further theoretical elaboration. In 
order to understand a “no war, no peace” society and its transformation(s) better, we need to turn 
to sociological theory, in particular institutional theory. Afterwards, we will discuss the methodology 
of our research. 
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4 Institutions and Reproduction of Conflict 
Violent conflict either breaks down societal institutions or changes their functioning. It also creates 
new ones that often create more conflict potential; for example, stereotyping among different 
groups grows, economic exchange decreases, and warrior myths arise. Fortunately, ending a conflict 
frequently offers opportunities to develop new institutions, sometimes from scratch. 
To study “no war, no peace” societies we first need to define what an institution is. Secondly, we 
should determine which specific form(s) of institution(s) we want to study (as independent 
variables). Thirdly, we should examine how these institutions influence behavior as they shape the 
context and conditions for human action (as independent variables). Finally, how and whether the 
dynamics of these institutions can be changed in a more peaceful direction (as dependent variables). 
4.1 Definitions 
Institutions are central to the social sciences. Durkheim even called sociology “the science of 
institutions.”57 The main problem in studying institutions is that many different phenomena, ranging 
from a handshake to an army or an international regime can be called an institution. The concept of 
institutions thus runs the risk of becoming a meaningless catchall phrase. It is therefore important to 
define what “institution” means. 
In this respect, it is sometimes confusing that at least three academic “schools” concern themselves 
with institutions in different ways: historical, economic and sociological institutionalism.58 While they 
share some roots in the “old” institutionalism of the turn of the 20th century, they developed rather 
separately from each other. For example, both the economic and sociological approaches speak of 
the “new” institutionalism but as shown below, these forms of institutionalism differ considerably 
despite their similarity in name. Still, all three schools commonly attempt to elucidate the role 
institutions play in determining social, political, and economic outcomes.59 As such, institutions are 
central to both the dynamics and (relative) stability of societal order and development.60 
 Historical Institutionalism 
“Historical institutionalists accepted the contention that conflict among rival groups for scarce 
resources lies at the heart of politics, but they sought (…) explanations for the distinctiveness of 
national political outcomes and for the inequalities that mark these outcomes. They found such 
explanations in the way the institutional organizations of the polity and economy structures conflict 
so as to privilege some interests while demobilizing others”.61 Many historical institutionalists look 
closely at the state, which is seen no longer as a neutral broker among competing interests but as a 
complex of institutions capable of structuring the character and outcomes of group conflict. In 
addition, they also explore “how other social and political institutions, of the sort associated with 
labor and capital, could structure interactions so as to generate distinctive national trajectories.” In 
 
______________________ 
57  Jepperson, R.L. 1991: Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism. In: W.W. Powell and P.J. 
DiMaggio (eds.): The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, p. 143. 
58  For a broader overview of different types of institutionalism, see Scott, W.R. 2001: Institutions and 
Organizations. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
59  Hall P.A. and Taylor R.C.R. 1996: Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms”. MPIFG Discussion 
Paper 96 (6). 
60  March J.G. and Olson J.P. 1998: The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders.” International 
Organization 52 (4), pp. 943-969. 
61  Hall and Taylor 1996: Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, p. 5. 
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this school, institutions “provide moral or cognitive templates for interpretation and action. (…) Not 
only do institutions provide strategically useful information, they also affect the very identities, self-
images and preferences of the actors.”62 
 Economic Institutionalism 
This form of institutionalism developed as a critique of neo-classical economics and its highly 
abstract mathematical models based on the (too) abstract idea of a homo economicus; He knows his 
utility preferences well and with (virtually) no effort finds and rationally processes information 
concerning alternative courses of action. It centers on how institutions, in particular transaction 
costs, property rights and contracts as well as bounded rationality, lead to satisficing instead of 
maximizing behavior. A well-known example is Williamson’s argument “that the development of a 
particular organizational form can be explained as the result of an effort to reduce the transaction 
costs of undertaking the same activity without such an institution.”63 In general, “property-rights 
allocations condition the economic results produced by a society and (…) transaction costs are 
responsible, in part, for the way in which property rights are allocated and reinforced. In short, the 
introduction of transaction costs into the orthodox model of productions and exchange (…) 
demands a fundamental reorientation in our thinking about economic processes.”64 Put differently, 
neo-institutionalist economics originally wanted to update and add to neo-classical theory but found 
many of the resulting economic models, although interesting, inconsistent. Nowadays, “new” 
institutional economics is increasingly differentiating from neo-classical economics.65 
 Sociological Institutionalism 
Sociological institutionalists define institutions in a broad way: “not just formal rules, procedures or 
norms, but the symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the frames of 
meaning guiding human action.” Of course, “such a definition breaks down the conceptual divide 
between institutions and culture. The two shade into each other.” 
The new institutionalists in sociology began to argue that many of the institutional forms and 
procedures used by modern organizations were not adopted simply because they were most efficient 
for the tasks at hand, in line with some transcendent ‘rationality.’ Instead, they argued that many of 
these forms and procedures should be seen as culturally specific practices, akin to the myths and 
ceremonies devised by many societies, and assimilated into organizations, not necessarily to 
enhance their formal means-ends efficiency, but as result of the kind of processes associated with 
the transmission of cultural practices more generally. Thus, they argued, even the most seemingly 
bureaucratic of practices have to be explained in cultural terms.66 
In this way, the sociological institutionalists developed a fresh perspective on the genesis and 
change of institutional practices and processes. Organizations often adopt new procedures or 
 
______________________ 
62  Ibid., pp. 6-8. 
63  Ibid., p. 11. 
64  Furubotn E. and R. Richter 2005: Institutions & Economic Theory: The Contribution of the New Institutional 
Economics. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, p. xii. 
65  Ibid. 
66  Hall and Taylor 1996: Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, p. 14. 
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structures, not because these advance means-ends efficiencies, but because these enhance 
social legitimacy.67 
Given the long history of institutionalism and the rather separate developments of the three - 
mainly mono-disciplinary - schools, it is not surprising that definitions of institutions abound. 
Parto recently came up with a comprehensive but not exhaustive list of definitions.68 
Table 1: Different Definitions of Institutions 
• Habits of a group or the customs of a people (Hamilton 1932) 
• Conventions, rules of action, embedded in social structure (locally specific) (Krätke 
1999) 
• Settled habits of thought common to the generality of men (Veblen 1919) 
• Collective action exercised by different types of organizations (family, corporation, 
trade union, state) in control of individual action (Commons 1924) 
• Convenient term for the more important among the widely prevalent, highly 
standardized social habits (Mitchell 1950) 
• Sets of rules of the game or codes of conduct defining social practice (Young 1994) 
• Formal organizations, patterns of behavior, negative norms and constraints (Coriat 
and Dosi, 1998) 
• Mental constructs (Neale 1987) 
• Rules of the game (North 1990) 
• How the game is played (Nelson and Sampat 2001) 
• A set of socially prescribed patterns of correlated behavior (Bush 1986) 
• Prescribed and proscribed patterns of correlated behavior (Tool 1993) 
• A relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for 
specific groups of actors in specific situations (March, Olson, 1998) 
• Constitutional rule systems for society, collective choice rules governing different 
kinds of organizations, operational rules of organizations (Ostrom 1999) 
• Norms that regulate relations among individuals (Parsons 1990) 
 
 
______________________ 
67  Powell W.W. and DiMaggio P.J. (eds.) 1991: The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
68  Parto, S. 2005: Good Governance and Policy Analysis: What of Institutions? Maastricht: MERIT. 
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Parto states that “the diversity of conceptualizations of institutions originating from these 
disciplines has generated a literature on institutions that is rich and extensive but difficult to 
operationalize.”69 Moreover, it should be noted that these forms of institutionalism are not 
always easily compatible. Some economic institutionalists still tend to combine neo-classical 
assumptions about independent individuals who strategically calculate and act to further 
their personal interests with their institutional approaches. Sociologists study more how such 
interests are culturally constituted. 
Nevertheless, all three schools use institutions to show how individuals with their bounded 
rationality deal with insecurity in situations they experience. Institutions both constrain and 
facilitate human action. In this respect, Jepperson writes “all institutions simultaneously 
empower and control.”70 In this way, they produce and reproduce human behavior. 
Jepperson states: 
An institution is (…) a social pattern that reveals a particular reproduction 
process. When departures from the pattern are counteracted in a regulated 
fashion by repetitively activated, socially constructed, controls - that is by 
some set of rewards and sanctions - we refer to a pattern as institutionalized. 
[Such] routine reproductive procedures support and sustain the pattern, 
furthering its reproduction - unless collective action blocks, or environmental 
shock disrupts, the reproductive process.71 
Institutions and their routine reproduction are often taken for granted.72 If people would 
continuously doubt an institution and try to change it, the reproduction process would cease 
to take place and the institution might disappear or become more weakly institutionalized. 
In summary, in all three schools institutions have some shared characteristics as they both 
constrain and enable human action. Institutions are generally reproduced, often 
unconsciously, over time. They “operate primarily by affecting persons’ prospective bets 
about the collective environment and collective activity.”73 Yet, there is a wide diversity of 
institutions and the three different schools mentioned above often study them in different 
ways. Still the different types of institutions can be brought together in the following 
figure.74 
 
 
 
______________________ 
69  Parto S. 2005: Economic Activity and Institutions: Taking Stock. Journal of Economic Issues XXXIX 
(1), pp. 1-32. 
70  Jepperson 1991: Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism. In: Powell and DiMaggio 
(eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, p. 146. 
71  Ibid. 
72  Zucker, L.G. 1991: The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence. In: W.W. Powell and P.J. 
DiMaggio (eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, pp. 83-107. 
73  Jepperson 1991: Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism. In: Powell and DiMaggio 
(eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, p. 147. 
74  Based on Parto, 2005: Economic Activity and Institutions: Taking Stock and Parto 2005: Good 
Governance and Policy Analysis: What of Institutions? 
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Table 2: Characteristics and Manifestations of Institutions 
Behavioral 
Institutions as 
standardized 
(recognizable) 
social habits - 
manifest in 
instinctive 
behavior of 
individuals 
and groups as 
reflections of 
social norms 
Cognitive 
Institutions as 
mental 
models and 
constructs or 
definitions, 
based on 
values and 
embedded in 
culture - 
aspired to by 
individuals 
and groups  
Associative 
Institutions as 
mechanisms 
facilitating 
prescribed or 
privileged 
interaction 
among 
different 
private and 
public 
interests - 
manifest in 
activities of 
groups of 
individuals 
Organizational 
Institutions as 
organizations, 
which are 
durable forms 
of joint goal-
oriented 
behavior that 
maintain clear 
boundaries 
between 
internal and 
external aspects 
- manifest in 
activities by 
organization 
members 
Regulative 
Institutions 
as 
prescriptions 
and 
proscriptions 
- manifest as 
the 
immediate 
boundaries 
of action by 
individuals 
and groups 
Constitutive 
Institutions 
setting the 
bounds of 
social 
relations - 
manifest as 
the ultimate 
boundaries 
of action by 
individuals 
and groups 
 
 
Informal; 
Social 
     
 
Formal; 
Societal 
Table 2 also implies that different institutions can be studied by different research methods, varying 
from quantitative questionnaires to anthropological participant observation. 
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4.2 Different Institutional Forms 
In this research, it is important to identify the specific types of institutions - or lack thereof - 
that we want to study. It is therefore central to our research to be able to identify different 
types of institutions. “Whether a practice is an institution is (…), relative to particular 
contexts.”75 
Within any system having multiple levels or orders of organizations, (…), 
primary levels of organization can operate as institutions relative to secondary 
levels organization. A (…) computer’s basic operating system appears as an 
institution relative to its word-processing program (especially to a software 
engineer). In collectivities, constitutional procedures may appear institutional 
relative to practices of formal organization, and the latter practices 
institutional relative to unorganized social practices. 
Further, whether an object is an institution is, (…), relative to a particular 
dimension of a relationship. (…) Parents are more institutions to their own 
children, than to other kids, as taken-for-granted realities; yet children may 
contest their own parents’ authority more than that of others’ parents. 76 
Finally, whether an object is an institution is, (…), relative to centrality. In 
systems, cores are institutions relative to peripheries. The regime of 
international politico-economic coordination is more an external, objective, 
constraint for Ghana than for the IMF. An association can be more an 
institution - more a fixed feature of an external environment - for a 
nonmember than for a member.77 
In a similar vein, Parto remarks that studying institutions can take place at different levels 
(individual, organizational, and societal), on different scales of governance (from local to 
global) and for different subsystems (economic, political, cultural, ecological, etc.).78 
In the final analysis, “the details and dimensions are here less important than the general 
point - that the same term, ‘in a different context’ (…) may, or may not, denote an 
institution. Whether we consider an object an institution depends upon what we are 
considering to be our analytical problem.”79 
For our study we should take into account that the different institutionalist schools cannot 
be applied wholesale to “no war, no peace” societies because our societies under study 
have their own problems with institutions that - in varying degrees - differ from those in the 
rich, Western world. Frequently, institutions have been weakened by war, they have been co-
opted by (competing) elites, or there is an absence of institutions that may foster peace. In 
 
______________________ 
75  Jepperson 1991: Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism. In: Powell and DiMaggio 
(eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, p. 146. 
76  More generally, “institutions are taken for granted… in the sense that they are both treated as 
relative fixtures in a social environment and explicated (accounted for) as functional elements of 
that environment.” Ibid. 
77  Ibid. 
78  Parto 2005: Economic Activity and Institutions: Taking Stock. Journal of Economic Issues XXXIX (1): 
pp. 1-32. Parto 2005: Good Governance and Policy Analysis: What of Institutions?  
79   An institution is generally not an idea or an individual. 
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the context of state-building and state-failure, Chesterman, Ignatieff, and Thakur have 
remarked: 
It is only through a more nuanced understanding of the state as a network of institutions 
that crises in governance may be properly understood and perhaps, avoided or remedied. In 
many situations, the remedy will depend upon variables that are political rather than 
institutional, although the sustainability of any outcome depends precisely upon 
institutionalizing procedures to remove that dependence on politics and personality.80 
As stated, our main research assumption is that a “no war, no peace” society continuously 
reproduces institutions, such as structures, formal organizations, informal groupings, and 
norms and values that generate conflict potential within a society, as well as within and 
among neighboring states. This reproduction of conflict potential undermines democratic 
transitions, economic development, and peacebuilding. Moreover, such reproduction usually 
implies strong normative disagreements within society, among or within groups, and the 
social exclusion of certain groups. As a consequence, the taken-for-granted nature of 
institutions may erode and sometimes informal or weak institutions may become more 
prevalent. Other institutions, for example, ethnic or religious ones may reify. 
The following table shows the different examples of institutions we derived from 
brainstorming during our conference in Bochum. Given the differences in context between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, both research teams may identify different institutions as relevant 
to the purpose of the study. It would be important, however, to compare these different 
types of institutions beforehand to see whether the research teams are on comparable 
tracks. 
Table 3: Conference Outcomes: Different Types of Institutions 
1. Societal Structures 
• The political system81 should be studied in at least two ways: 
- The characterization of the type of rule, for example: 
¾ Democratic 
¾ Authoritarian 
¾ Totalitarian 
¾ Autocratic 
¾ Kleptocratic 
¾ Oligarchic/Plutocratic 
- The administrative system, subdivided in (Trias Politica) 
¾ Executive 
¾ Legislative 
¾ Judiciary 
• The economic system 
• The legal system 
• The religious system 
• The cultural system (e.g., changes in ethnic identity) 
 
______________________ 
80  Chesterman S., M. Ignatieff and R. Thakur 2004: Making States Work: From State Failure to State-
Building. New York: International Peace Academy/United Nations University, p. 2. 
81  The term rule was rejected in favor of system during the Bochum conference. 
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______________________ 
82  During the Bochum conference, we had a long conversation whether we should include informal 
groups, such as criminals/mafia, (illegal) traders, armed gangs, and warlords into our research. 
Although this discussion was not closed, during our brainstorming we did not employ this type of 
institution as a separate category. 
2. Organizations82 
• Religious organizations 
• Diaspora (organizations) 
• Labor unions 
• Refugee groups 
• Political parties 
• Government (needs to be subdivided and elaborated on, e.g., main power holders within 
the government. It could also be that some kind of hidden shadow government exists.) 
- Presidential Office (or more correctly, certain members in the presidential office) 
- Ministry of Defense 
- Family of the President 
- Parliament 
- Local government bodies 
- Local commissions 
- Courts (and their degree of independence) 
- Oligarchs 
• Media 
- Newspapers 
- Television 
- Radio 
• Think tanks 
• University/Universities 
• Private enterprise 
• Mafia (see also oligarchs) 
• Warlords (are currently not present) 
• NGOs (= Non-governmental organizations) 
• Veterans and combatants 
• Interest groups based on place of origin (kinship groups, village interest groups, cultural 
groups) 
• Ethnic minority groups 
• Security actors: 
- Military 
- Police 
- Secret Service 
- Border Patrol 
- Russian Military Bases 
- Western actors (American/NATO bases for oil-pipeline security; OECD) 
• Migrants 
 
3. Norms and Values 
• Stereotypes of one’s own group or another: 
- Hospitality 
- Family 
- Labor ethic 
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- Brave/Cowardly 
- Impudence/Brutality 
- Aggressiveness 
- Nationalism 
- Laziness 
- Patriotism 
- Fear 
- Tolerance 
- Peace-loving 
- Hypocrisy 
- Other? 
• Myths: 
- Victimization (and Genocide) 
- De-victimization 
- ”Armenization” 
- Long-suffering 
- (Russification was dropped, because it was not considered relevant 
anymore) 
• Identity/Roles: 
- Ethnic (Turkic or Caucasian) 
- Religious (Positive or Negative) 
- Regional (sub-national and supra-national) 
- (Post-)Soviet 
- Cultural 
- Other? 
• Generational/ideological (and the influence on perception). 
This list may need adaptation during our operationalization. It may also turn out that we 
need to identify alternative types of institutions (or actors) that have either always been 
lacking or have been destroyed, so that peacebuilding and democratic development could 
not take off. Similarly, we may also have to include some international institutions and/or 
actors. In any case, during operationalization we will need to establish more objective criteria 
for determining which institutions count. 
4.3 How Institutions Influence Behavior and Society 
The three schools differ in their study of the processes by which institutions influence 
behavior. The main characteristic that they share is, as stated above, that institutions 
consciously or subconsciously affect the way people anticipate their collective environment, 
as well as collective and individual activity. 
The historical school has two different approaches to the question of how institutions 
influence behavior. The first adopts a calculus approach and focuses “on those aspects of 
human behavior that are instrumental and based on strategic calculation. They assume that 
individuals seek to maximize the attainment of a set of goals given by a specific preference 
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function and, in doing so, behave strategically. They canvass all possible options to select 
those conferring maximum benefits. In general, the actor’s goals or preferences are given 
exogenously to the institutional analysis.83 
With this calculus approach institutions provide information about the behavior of others - of 
power relations, enforcement mechanisms, penalties, pay off schemes, etc. Put concisely, 
institutions alter the expectations of actors about other actors in response to or during their 
own actions. 
A second, more cultural approach stresses “the degree to which behavior is not fully 
strategic but bounded by an individual’s worldview.”84 For example, people often follow 
familiar routines, rely on ethnic relations, or follow religious ideas to formulate and reach 
their goals. Hence, “institutions provide moral or cognitive templates for interpretation and 
action” but in the process they may cause an uneven distribution of power among different 
groups.85 
As stated, the economic school emphasized as its main institutions: property rights, 
transaction costs, and contracts. For example, ownership structures of companies can 
strongly influence the performance of such companies. Similarly, the position that people 
hold in state or private bureaucracies may influence their rent-seeking behavior, especially if 
patronage is rampant. And whether contracts are being upheld, as well as the way in which 
this is being done, strongly determines the costs of transactions and therewith the 
opportunities for economic growth.86 Scholars in this vein of theory often see politics as a 
series of collective action dilemmas where individual goal-maximizing behavior can produce 
an outcome that is collectively suboptimal.87 
Neo-classical assumptions and game-theoretical/statistical models often emphasize such 
strategically calculating behavior of individuals. Economic institutionalists traditionally 
accepted these assumptions and worked to update these models but most neo-
institutionalists increasingly move away from these assumptions and models and incorporate 
more sociological approaches. 
The sociological institutionalists also emphasize the role of culture but do so in a very 
nuanced way. Older forms of institutional sociological analysis emphasized how roles and 
concomitant norms and values shaped behavior. They often stressed how vested interests 
led to unintended consequences and goal displacement. Newer lines of inquiry put more 
emphasis on the cognitive dimension (e.g., scripts) of institutions as they influence human 
behavior. In this way, this form of institutionalism comes close to social constructivism.88 
Accordingly, this type of sociologists often describes how individual action and institutions 
interact and frequently mutually constitute each other. 
 
 
______________________ 
83 Hall and Taylor 1996: Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, p. 7. 
84  Ibid. 
85  Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
86  Furubotn and Richter 2005: Institutions & Economic Theory: The Contribution of the New 
Institutional Economics. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 
87  Conceptually, this is similar to the security dilemma. 
88  Powell and DiMaggio 1991: The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, pp. 1-38. 
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For our research, it is important that we continue to think about how institutions reproduce 
behavior and shape action and therewith influence prospects for peacebuilding and 
democratization. The above ways in which institutions can influence human action will help 
us to think through possible ways in which the potential for conflict or peace is being 
reproduced. For example, a growing role for oligarchs may lead to a marginalization of other 
economic groups and a change in political elites. 
Table 4: Conference outcomes of institutional influences in “no war, no peace” 
societies89 
Psycho-social characteristics of “no war, no peace” societies 
• Alienation 
• Personalization 
• Victimization 
• De-victimization 
• Armenization:  
• Identification  
• Socialization 
Political characteristics of “no peace, no war” societies 
• Politicization 
• Legitimization 
• Instrumentalization 
• Securitization 
Economic characteristics of “no war, no peace” societies 
• Commodification 
• Redistribution 
• Reproduction 
• Oligarchization 
Social characteristics of “no war, no peace” societies 
• Criminalization 
• Decriminalization 
Normative characteristics of “no war, no peace” societies 
• Dehumanization 
• Heroization 
In this respect, it is important to note that institutions in war zones, and to some extent also 
in “no war, no peace” societies, have often been weakened, sometimes even specifically 
targeted for destruction. At the same time, many institutions may have a more informal 
character. It will be important for our research to identify these informal institutions - such as 
criminal gangs, mafia, warlords, informal markets, intermediary rule, patronage, regularized 
political backroom dealing - rather than more formal state bureaucracies.
 
______________________ 
89  For more details including definitions, see the outcomes of the Bochum conference. 
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4.4 Institutional Change 
Institutions tend to persist, but are not immune to change. The following points indicate how 
institutions may change - or not - over time within one society or among different societies. 
• In “no war, no peace” societies, the role of violence - either structural or direct - in society has 
usually grown. Both the institutionalization of violence, as well as the impact of violence, for 
example through unresolved trauma or control over resource extraction and asset stripping, may 
be important for our research. 
• Even though institutions usually persist over time, sudden shocks from outside society (this can 
literally be an earthquake that shows the incompetent response by political elites - like in 
Nicaragua) and new forms of collective action with new normative claims from inside society, 
for example by a students movement (e.g., Otpor in Serbia), may deeply influence some 
institutions and actions. The taken-for-granted nature of some institutions may become 
disputed. Examples include: 
- Formal institutions may become more informal or vice versa. 
- Highly institutionalized phenomena may become more weakly institutionalized or 
vice versa. 
- Institutions may disappear or become newly formed. 
• In response to new societal demands or international diplomatic pressure, institutions may also 
adapt more slowly. In this sense, it is useful to study whether different types of institutions are 
compatible with each other, reinforce each other, uneasily coexist, weaken, or replace other 
institutions. 
• Institutions may simply be very robust and not change at all or only a little. 
Finally, given the weakening and destruction of some institutions during war, as well as the potential 
absence of useful institutions for peacebuilding and democratization, our research should also make 
an effort to think through alternative forms of institutions and actions that currently do not exist.
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5 The Larger Research Project:  
Methodology, Objectives and Outputs 
5.1 Research Strategy 
This part discusses the methodology for the larger research project, entitled “No War, No Peace” 
society: Problems and Perspectives of Democratic Transformations, Conflict Resolution and 
Peacebuilding for which this study serves as a methodological background document.90 The multi-
dimensional character of our research object requires a comparative multi-method sociological 
research strategy. Hence, a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods will be used to 
study our research topic from different perspectives. 
Our research methods include desk-based analysis, expert surveys, mass surveys, focus groups, and 
document analysis. 
Desk-based theoretical analysis aims at elaborating a model that will provide a conceptual basis for 
the empirical investigation. In the framework of the proposed research project, we use desk-based 
analysis as an instrument for generating theory closely related to empirical practice. Such conceptual 
or theoretical knowledge helps designing, operationalizing, and interpreting key aspects of this 
research. 
Expert surveys provide an opportunity to obtain opinions and evaluations concerning the topic from 
competent, recognized experts. 
The aim of mass surveys is to provide an objective picture of public opinion, which will help to 
characterize the current potential of both peace and conflict and to reveal support for peacebuilding 
efforts in Armenia and Azerbaijan (based on the analysis of the population’s perceptions, value 
orientations, social expectations, and attitudes). 
The method of focus groups enables us to obtain information on real socio-psychological 
mechanisms of the formation of public opinion for different segments of the population. The results 
of focus-groups surveys will give the opportunity to deepen information received by mass surveys 
and help understand different population groups in Armenia and Azerbaijan and their perception of 
conflict potential and possible ways of conflict transformation and peacebuilding. This method will 
give an opportunity to reveal mechanisms for the formation of ideas on the research subject under 
the conditions of a modeled situation when group dynamics influence respondents in expressing 
their opinions. 
5.2 Research Plan 
The project will consist of five discrete but interrelated research tasks that will be coordinated by the 
different project partners. 
Task 1 concerns the analysis of existing scientific knowledge on “no war, no peace” societies at a 
conceptual level. The main goal of the task is to develop a theoretical and methodological model 
that better corresponds with the characteristics and changing nature of “no war, no peace” 
societies. The current paper is the outcome of task 1. It provides the conceptual basis of this study 
and begins developing tools for comparative sociological research of Armenian and Azerbaijani 
societies. It supports operationalization and thus provides an opportunity for later systematic 
scholarly analysis of the research results. 
 
______________________ 
90  Section 5 is to a large extent based on our INTAS research proposal. 
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Task 2 aims at gathering empirical evidence and provides a comparative analysis of institutional 
characteristics of Armenian and Azerbaijani societies based upon the theoretical findings from the 
previous task. To this end, this task deals with research and analysis of factors and mechanisms 
producing conflict potential and institutionalization of “no war, no peace” situations in Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. 
Task 3 aims at providing comparative analysis of the state-of-the-art and perspectives for democratic 
transformations related to peacebuilding in Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
Task 4 summarizes the theoretical and empirical findings from the previous tasks. At this stage, 
researchers seek to identify the main factors, institutions and development trends that determine 
either in a negative or positive manner peacebuilding and democratization in Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. To this end the task aims to formulate scientific hypotheses/theory concerning 
preconditions, alternatives and scenarios of transforming “no war, no peace” societies into peaceful 
and democratic states. 
Task 5 focuses on the finalization and dissemination of project results, including the preparation of 
the final report, which consists of a technical report, a methodological report, a financial report, as 
well as an analytical report with policy recommendations. 
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5.3 Research Objectives and Outputs 
The project will develop a theory or at least a set of hypotheses about the specific characteristics of 
“no war, no peace” societies. In the next research round, we can then also study other “no war, no 
peace” societies from a comparative perspective. We will also highlight “Issues for Further 
Research” and “Policy Recommendations.”  
After our conference in Bochum, we already discussed several outputs. As the next stage of our 
research concerns operationalization, it is important to keep these publications in mind. The research 
outputs help further operationalization, as well as to raise awareness about possible target groups 
for research results, varying from other social scientists to the interested public, as well as national 
and international policy makers. The following publications have been agreed upon: 
 
Nr. Title 
Place of 
publication 
Language By whom 
1 Concept paper Bern EN D. Dijkzeul 
2 Comparative Survey on 
Methodology 
Yerevan RUS L. Harutyunyan 
3 State and Society 
Building in Armenia  
Yerevan ARM 
RUS 
S. Astvatsaturov 
4 State and Society 
Building in Azerbaijan  
Baku (AZ) 
RUS 
A. Yunusov 
5 Conflict Settlement in the 
Eyes of the Public in 
Armenia 
Yerevan ARM 
RUS 
S. Astvatsaturov 
6 Conflict Settlement in the 
Eyes of the Public in 
Azerbaijan 
Baku (AZ) 
RUS 
A. Yunusov 
7 International Studies 
Association Conference 
Paper 
Bochum English Dijkzeul, Harutyunyan, 
Astvatsaturov and Yunusov 
8 Follow Up Report/Final 
Edited Volume 
Bern English H. Krummenacher 
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